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ABSTRACT 
We assess the applicability of Mayer, Schoorman, and Davis’ (1995) Integrative Model 
of Organizational Trust for modeling citizens’ trust in their government, using  
country-level survey data collected in four Western Trans-Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, 
Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria) in 2010.  Although the original model focused on trust 
between individuals, our fundamental supposition is that the model also applies to 
individuals’ trust in an organizational-level entity:  government.  Our findings also 
suggest there are two separate dimensions to ability and benevolence/integrity associated 
with trust in government, as well as the existence of a new term that we hypothesize is 
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Multiple social science perspectives state that trust is critical to human interaction.  
For example, psychologists suggest that “trust is one of the most important components—
and perhaps the most essential ingredient—for the development and maintenance of … 
well-functioning relationships” (Simpson, 2007a, p. 587).  Similarly, commentators from 
the field of international relations have stated that trust within the international system is 
“the underpinning of all human contact and institutional interaction” (Blind, 2006, p. 3).  
Organizational management perspectives reach a similar conclusion about the cross-
disciplinary importance of trust studies (e.g., Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007).  Even 
American military perspectives from the counterinsurgency battlefields of Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggest that generating trust between American service members and local 
populations is more important than kinetics and force.  For example, David Kilcullen, the 
noted Australian counterinsurgency expert, states that trust building in the 
counterinsurgency context is the military’s “true main effort:  everything else is secondary” 
(Kilcullen, 2010, p. 37).  As a result of these growing perspectives, researchers have called 
for more relevant, cross-cultural, macro-level investigations of trust (e.g., Bachmann, 2011; 
Li, 2011; Mishra & Mishra, 2013). 
This manuscript is the first to explore the utility of Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman’s 
(1995) Integrative Model of Organizational Trust for understanding citizen trust in 
government.  Mayer et al.’s Integrative Model of Organizational Trust has been used to 
explain interpersonal trust outcomes in the business world (Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & 
Tan, 2000), the medical community (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996), psychology 
(Simpson, 2007a; 2007b), and others (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2007).  Despite the 
overwhelming utility of the Mayer model for understanding interpersonal trust generation 
in multiple contexts, it has, to our knowledge, never been used to understand citizen trust in 
government.  This is surprising since Mayer and colleagues (e.g., Schoorman, Mayer, & 
Davis, 2007) claim that their model is robust for understanding an individual’s trust in 
organizations, though they tend to think of trust in business organizations as opposed to 
governments, and as Mayer and colleagues noted, “the 1995 framework is fairly robust 
across levels of analysis” (Schoorman et al., p. 345).  From their perspective, the same 
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variables that impact trust between people “also affect the extent to which an organization 
will be trusted” by people (Schoorman et al., 2007, p. 345). 
This paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe  
Mayer et al.’s Integrative Model of Organizational Trust and how elements of the 
framework can be applied to understanding citizen trust in government.  We also discuss 
existing research on trust in government that, despite not using the Mayer et al. model as an 
organizing framework, appears to support the Mayer et al. concept.  Subsequently, we 
describe our analysis of survey data from four countries in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa 
(Senegal, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali), where we assess whether the Integrative Model 
of Organizational Trust is appropriate for understanding citizen reports of trust in 
government.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our results and recommendations 





Multiple theoretical frameworks, across disciplines, attempt to explain how trust is 
generated.  For example, Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, and Agnew (1999) propose a trust 
generation theory based in psychology, often used to explain trust in romantic relationships, 
which describes how trust is generated between two people.  Simpson (2007a; 2007b) 
proposes a dyadic theory of trust generation that focuses on the impact of personality 
variables across multiple stages of the trust generation process.  Hardin (2006) proposes a 
view based in political philosophy that helps explain how people have developed trust 
across time.  Vigoda-Gadot (2006), in a model of voice orientations, proposes that trust in 
governance is a function of satisfaction with services, organizational politics, and ethics.  
Combs and Blincoe (2013) propose a new theoretical framework specifically designed to 
understand how trust is generated cross culturally, with an aim towards understanding trust 
on the battlefield.  While each of these trust models is useful, perhaps the most celebrated 
social science model of trust generation is Mayer et al.’s now classic Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust (Mayer et al., 1995).  Developed in the mid-1990s to organize a very 
disjointed social sciences trust literature, Mayer et al.’s model has now received extensive 
supporting empirical treatment and, by 2007, has been cited over a thousand times 
(Schoorman et al., 2007). 
A. INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST 
In 1995, Mayer and colleagues introduced their Integrative Model of Organizational 
Trust.  Trust, from Mayer et al.’s perspective, is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable 
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712).  According to their framework, as shown in 
Figure 1, trust is a result of trustworthiness.  In this case, trustworthiness is a function of the 
trustor’s (the person doing the trusting) perceptions of the trustee’s (the person who would 
be trusted) ability, benevolence, and integrity (each explained in more detail in Section B).  
These components of trustworthiness, along with a person’s dispositional propensity to 
trust, theoretically predict the level of trust that a trustor has in a trustee.  The Mayer et al. 
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model is a feedback loop, where trust is tested in a risk-taking situation, an outcome is 
observed, and then the trustor’s assessment of the trustee is subsequently updated. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mayer et al.’s (1995) Integrative Model of Organizational Trust. 
Mayer et al.’s model was originally proposed to explain trust in business 
relationships.  For example, the process in Figure 1 was designed to explain when an 
employee might trust a supervisor.  If the employee perceives the supervisor as having 
sufficient ability, benevolence, and integrity, then the employee is more likely to trust the 
supervisor and be willing to be vulnerable to his or her direction, leadership, etc. 
B. COMPONENTS AND DEFINITIONS WITHIN THE INTEGRATIVE 
MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST 
As noted, Mayer et al. (1995) suggest that trustworthiness is made up of ability, 
benevolence, and integrity.  This section characterizes each of these trustworthiness 
elements and provides research examples indicating that each has an impact on trust in 
government.  The section concludes with a brief example of how the overall framework 
could play out regarding trust in government. 
Mayer et al. (1995) define ability as “that group of skills, competencies, and 
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain”  
(p. 717).  Essentially, ability is a trustor’s perception of a person or organization’s ability to 
successfully complete a task.  The impact of this trustworthiness component on trust makes 
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intuitive sense.  A trustor would not be willing to make themselves vulnerable to the 
actions of a trustee if the trustee is incompetent to achieve some relevant task.  Of course, 
as Combs and Blincoe (2013) note, “ability varies from domain to domain and situation to 
situation.”  At a personal trust level, an auto mechanic might be very good at repairing 
domestic cars, but have little background with foreign cars.  As such, a trustor’s sense of a 
trustee’s ability to repair his or her car will clearly vary across situations, as will a trustor’s 
overall trust in the trustee. 
From an organizational standpoint, the degree to which a person believes a business 
or government is trustworthy, and therefore trusts the business or government, should also 
depend on the ability of the organization in question.  For example, trust in an auto 
manufacturer is probably dependent, to a degree, on the organization’s ability to produce a 
quality product.  That is, people probably ask themselves some variant of the question:  Can 
this manufacturer get the job done?  Similarly, trust in government is probably dependent, 
to a degree, on the government’s ability to produce things like effective security, 
infrastructure, and economic growth.  Like the auto manufacturer example, people probably 
ask themselves some variant of the question:  Can this government get the job done? 
Multiple research projects, often from the field of political science, have examined 
the impact of citizens’ perception of government ability on reports of citizens’ trust in 
government.1  For example, Blind (2006) points out that a government’s ability to provide 
security and services impacts citizens’ trust in government.  Blind also states that a sense of 
government professionalism and competence has much the same effect.  Hetherington 
(1998) similarly points out that a number of perspectives on government trust are based on 
perceptions of government efficiency: 
Because people are likely to trust things they perceive to be working effectively, the 
quality of policy outcomes should also help explain trust.  Public perceptions of the 
                                                 
1 It is important to keep in mind that, in some cases, the term trust is used differently in political 
science than the way that Mayer et al. use the term.  Sometimes the term trust in political science 
more resembles the psychological term attitude (e.g., Hetherington, 1998).  In other cases, the 
term trust more resembles Mayer et al.’s trustworthiness construct (e.g., Blind 2006).  Regardless, 
usage of the term is similar enough between the political science research and the Mayer et al. 
research that we use the concept interchangeably. 
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government’s ability to solve problems that are personally most important should 
have a strong bearing on political trust.  (p. 794) 
Kim (2010) finds “that government performance on the economy, . . . the quality of 
public services, crime, and attention to citizen input are significantly associated with broad 
public trust in government in both Japan and South Korea” (p. 801).  Similarly, Christensen 
and Laegreid (2005) conclude that “citizens who are satisfied with specific public services 
generally have a higher trust in public institutions than citizens who are dissatisfied”  
(p. 487).  Hetherington (2006) also states that, “Most Americans simply do not think the 
government is capable of doing the job [referring to a number of policy matters] well 
enough or fairly enough” (p. 5).  In his analysis, Hetherington found that citizens’ trust in 
government was strongly related to support for government programs, such as foreign aid 
and food stamps. 
Mayer et al. (1995) define benevolence as “the extent to which a trustee is believed 
to want to do good for the trustor” (p. 720).  Essentially, benevolence is a trustor’s 
perception that a person or organization cares about the trustor.  A trustor might believe that 
a trustee has high ability, but if a trustor does not believe that the trustee wants to do good 
for the trustor, then his or her trust is clearly diminished.  As Davis et al. (2000) note, 
“Benevolence represents a positive personal orientation of the trustee to the trustor”  
(p. 566).  They suggest that in a business context, at the individual level, benevolence might 
manifest for an employee (the trustor) when a manager (the trustee) is willing to “go out of 
his or her way” for the employee. 
From an organizational standpoint, the degree to which a person or persons believes 
a business or government is trustworthy, and therefore trusts the business or government, 
should also depend on the benevolence of the organization in question.  From Mayer and 
colleagues’ perspective, benevolence might not be a major factor in trust in a business 
since, after all, what business can afford to be truly benevolent?  Yet, clearly, the 
benevolence of a government, the degree to which a trustor believes that a government 
wants to do good for the citizens, should have an impact on citizen trust.  As Vigoda-Gadot 
(2006) argued: 
 . . . when citizens perceive bureaucracy as insensitive, feel that it promotes the 
interests of powerful individuals or groups based on political considerations, and 
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believe that it engages in unfair practices, public attitudes towards democracy may 
become more cynical.  Similarly, citizens may react negatively, either cognitively 
and/or behaviorally, by reducing their levels of trust and confidence in governance.  
(p. 290) 
Thus, if a government seems uncaring about the day-to-day travails of its citizenry, citizen 
willingness to trust that government should be hampered.  On the other hand, if a 
government is perceived as caring and responsive to the needs of its citizens, it makes sense 
that the citizens might afford the government more trust. 
As Blind (2006) notes, in many developed nations where trust is lowest, citizens 
commonly report that their government does not care about their needs (also see Dalton, 
2005).  Along these lines, Warren (1999) suggests that governments are better trusted when 
they take on the interests of their citizens.  Warren (2006) also notes that citizens’ 
perceptions of government sincerity are helpful in generating government-level trust.  
Miller (1974) made a similar point when he found that the perception that a government 
“does not function for [the citizens]” is associated with distrust (p. 951).  He also points out 
that one way to reduce citizens’ distrust in government is for a government to generate 
policies that are more clearly and obviously responsive to the needs of the citizenry.  Miller 
and Listhaug (1990) came to a similar conclusion in their comparative analysis between 
Sweden, Norway, and the United States.  They found that governments that have a more 
flexible party system (as opposed to a rigid, two-party system) are often more trusted 
because the citizenry believes that at least some element of the government, even if it is a 
very small party, cares about their specific needs. 
The final element of Mayer et al.’s trustworthiness construct is integrity.  Mayer  
et al. (1995) define integrity as “the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of 
principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (p. 719).  This concept does not imply that the 
trustor and trustee have exactly the same set of principles; rather, this definition indicates 
that the trustor adheres to some consistent moral code and is generally fair and just  
(e.g., Colquitt et al., 2007).  As Davis et al. (2000) put it, “Such factors as consistency, a 
reputation for honesty, and fairness all contribute to the . . . perception of integrity”  
(p. 567).  Van Ryzin (2011) found that “process has a consistently large effect on trust of 
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civil servants” (p. 745) and the beneficial aspects of government processes include fairness, 
equity, respect, and honesty. 
From an organizational standpoint, the degree to which a person or persons believes 
a business or government is trustworthy and, therefore, trusts the business or government, 
should also depend on the integrity of the organization in question.  From the perspective of 
a business, perceptions of integrity are probably based on a company’s fulfilment of 
contractual obligations and a general abiding by business rules and norms.  For a 
government, perceptions of integrity are probably based on similar perceptions.  In 
addition, a sense that a government operates within the rules it has created and avoids 
corruption probably has an impact on integrity and subsequent trust. 
Research on perceptions of government corruption support the Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust in the sense that governmental integrity (or lack thereof) affects 
citizens’ trust in government.  For example, multiple research perspectives note that scandal 
and corruption have devastating impacts on reports of trust in government.  Warren (2006), 
for example, notes that corruption is corrosive, undermines democracy, and creates 
cynicism.  Kim (2010) finds “that government performance on . . . controlling political 
corruption . . . [is] significantly associated with broad public trust in government” (p. 801).  
Research by Morris and Klesner (2010) supports this notion and found that government-
level corruption not only diminishes trust in government, it also produces increased 
corruption, creating a vicious cycle of decreased trust and increased corruption.  Morris and 
Klesner (2010) also point out that exposure to political scandal reduces political trust and 
has even been linked to voter apathy in both the United States (U.S.) (Peters & Welsh, 
1980) and Mexico (McCann & Dominguez, 1998).  Similarly, Dalton (2005) expanded on 
the pervasiveness of these issues and noted that political scandals over the past several 
decades have contributed to the decreasing levels of trust in government found across 
almost all advanced industrial democracies. 
C. TRUST, RISK TAKING, OUTCOMES, AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Within the Mayer et al. framework, the more trustworthy that a trustee is, 
presumably, the more a trustor will be willing to be vulnerable to that person (or 
organization).  In our case, the more trustworthy that a government is, the more trust that a 
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trustor should have in his or her government, in the sense that the trustor should be willing 
to take on more risk when a risk-taking situation presents itself.  For example, strong trust 
in a government might manifest itself in risk-taking actions, such as general support for a 
government, as well as practical action, such as voting.  Presumably, as detailed by the 
model framework, after a person engages in some kind of risk-taking behaviour (such as 
casting a vote to keep a government in power), the outcome of that risk-taking situation 
should feedback and update subsequent perceptions of the government’s trustworthiness. 
A relevant example of this framework of trust generation relates to a recent policy 
directive of the Obama Administration.  In June 2012, the U.S. government implemented 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).  Under the DACA, illegal immigrants 
who were brought into the United States as children, who have graduated from U.S. 
schools, and who meet other requirements can obtain official deferment of deportation from 
the U.S. government (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  In order to do so, 
however, they must first make themselves very vulnerable by identifying themselves to the 
government, trusting that the government will honour its promise and not immediately 
deport them.  The degree to which such “illegal” individuals believe that the American 
government is trustworthy (i.e., possesses ability, benevolence, and integrity), should 
predict the degree to which they trust the government of the United States and the degree to 
which they will be willing to take a risk and operate within the bounds of the DACA 
framework. 
D. THEORETICAL DEBATE REGARDING THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST 
While this section has explained the distinctions between ability, benevolence, and 
integrity, and their theoretically unique impacts on trust, it is important to note that there is 
some debate in the literature regarding the unique contributions of each trustworthiness 
factor on trust.  Some empirical analyses (e.g., Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998; Mayer 
& Gavin, 2005) have found that integrity and benevolence do not uniquely contribute to 
trust.  For example, Mayer and Gavin (2005), in a study regarding factory workers’ trust in 
leadership, found that benevolence did not uniquely predict trust, while ability and integrity 
were significant contributors to trust.  Mayer and Gavin suggested that this was likely due 
to multicollinearity among the trustworthiness survey items.  On the other hand, Colquitt  
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et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis of dozens of papers on trust found that each trustworthiness 





III. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This study addresses the following questions:  Is the Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust, applied to citizens’ trust in their government, empirically supported 
by our data?  If so, is there a consistent model construct across countries?  And, in terms of 
modelling citizen trust in government, do the benevolence and integrity trustworthiness 
factors have a unique impact on trust? 
To address these questions, we posed the following hypotheses: 
• H1:  The Integrative Model of Organizational Trust is an appropriate 
framework for understanding and modelling citizens’ trust in government. 
• H2:  The ability, integrity, and benevolence trustworthiness factor constructs 
are country-specific. 
• H3:  The benevolence and integrity trustworthiness factors each have a 






























The data for this study comes from surveys independently fielded in  
Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal in November and December of 2010.  We 
selected these nations both because of their geographic proximity in the Western  
Trans-Sahel region of Africa and because of their differences in history, perception of 
democracy, and the adherence to governance.  By separately modelling four countries, 
which represent different governmental, political, and cultural variants (see Appendix A), 
we are able to assess how robust the resulting framework is and whether our results are 
likely to be generalizable or country-specific. 
The survey was administered to a representative cross-section of people in each 
country.  The questions are predominantly 4- and 5-point Likert scale-based and focus on 
quality of life, governance, politics, security, social tolerance, and opinions about 
international relations.  The surveys were designed and fielded following standard survey 
principles and procedures (e.g., Dillman, 2006; Groves et al., 2004).  Upon completion of 
instrument design, the surveys underwent extensive pretesting in the field prior to their use 
in the 2010 data collection effort. 
A. SAMPLE 
Strict probability samples were selected via a stratified, clustered area sampling 
scheme designed to be nationally representative, with a margin of error of 2.6% or less.  
The target population was adults aged 18 and over.  A total of N = 8,786 responses were 
obtained; the final sample sizes, response rates, and margins of error for each country are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Sample sizes, response rates, and margins of error by country. 







Burkina Faso 1,447 1,481 98.0% 2.6% 
Mali 2,091 1,874 89.6% 2.3% 
Nigeria 4,423 3,770 85.2% 1.6% 
Senegal 1,703 1,661 97.5% 2.5% 
Aggregate 9,664 8,786 90.9% N/A 
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Data were collected via face-to-face interviews conducted by professional, local 
survey companies using interviewers who were fluent in the local dialect(s) and who were 
culturally aware and sensitive to local and national customs.  With minor exceptions, the 
surveys asked the same questions, translated into the appropriate languages and dialects, 
across all four countries. 
B. MEASURES 
Measures were initially derived from the survey questions using exploratory factor 
analysis via the R statistical package (R Core Team, 2012).  In particular, we used parallel 
analysis to determine the number of factors via the fa.parallel function of the R psych 
package (Revelle, 2011) and we used the factanal function in the base package to derive 
the factor loadings (using the varimax rotation).  The intent of this exploratory modelling is 
to gain some insight into whether the survey items produce factors that reflect the Mayer et 
al. trustworthiness constructs—ability, benevolence, and integrity—as well as trust in 
government and propensity to trust constructs.  See Fricker, Kulzy, and Appleget (2012); 
Mulaik (2010); and DiStefano, Zhu, and Mîndrilă (2009) for additional discussions of 
factor analysis. 
Tables 2-4 show the resulting factors for Mali, while the detailed results for all four 
countries, including factor loadings, are shown in Appendix B.  Table 5 shows Guttman’s 
λ6 values (Guttman, 1945) for all factors and all countries.  While Guttman’s λ6 values in 
Table 5 suggest reasonable scale reliability, we note that the fact that the factors largely 
replicate across the four countries indicates that the λ6 values are conservative lower 
bounds on the actual reliability. 
As Tables 2-5 and Appendix B show, and as discussed in more detail in Appendix 
B, the factors do, in fact, align well with the Mayer et al.’s constructs, though each of the 
trustworthiness constructs manifest in greater detail than single “ability,” “integrity,” and 
“benevolence” measures and the specific measures vary some between the countries.  
Similarly, a clear trustor propensity measure manifests, as do measures of trust in 
government.  These measures were then used as the starting point for structural equation 




Table 2.  Survey items that measure trust in government and trustor propensity, along with mean and standard deviations for Mali 
respondents. 














3.   How much trust do you have in President [NAME]? –2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 1.247 1.11 
4.   To what extent do you approve of President [NAME]’s 
overall performance? 
–2 = Strongly 
disapprove 
+2 = Strongly 
approve 
1.312 0.91 
5.   How much trust do you have in Prime Minister 
[NAME]? 
–2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 0.733 1.36 
6.   How much trust do you have in your National 
Assembly? 
–2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 0.406 1.43 
7.   How much trust do you have in your political parties? –2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot –0.175 1.46 
8.   How much trust do you have in your armed forces? –2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 1.239 1.11 
9.   How much trust do you have in your local police? –2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 0.547 1.40 
10.  How much trust do you have in your local 
government? 
–2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 0.486 1.35 
11.  How much trust do you have in your courts and 
judges? 













13.  How much do you trust your relatives? –2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 1.770 0.67 
14.  How much do you trust people from your ethnic 
group? 
–2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 1.429 1.01 
15.  How much do you trust people who share your 
religion? 
–2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 1.505 0.94 
16.  How much do you trust people from other ethnic 
groups? 
–2 = No trust at all +2 = A lot 0.772 1.35 
17.  How much do you trust people who practice a different 
religion? 




Table 3.  Survey items that measure integrity and benevolence, along with mean and standard deviations for Mali respondents. 














 How much do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
    
18. People of all religions are free to practice 
their faith. 
–2 = Strongly disagree +2 = Strongly agree 1.623 0.85 
19. People are free to join any organization 
they want. 
–2 = Strongly disagree +2 = Strongly agree 1.607 0.84 
20. People are free to criticize the government. –2 = Strongly disagree +2 = Strongly agree 1.199 1.18 
21. People choose their political leaders 
through fair elections. 
–2 = Strongly disagree +2 = Strongly agree 0.829 1.41 
22. The media are free to accurately report the 
news. 









1. How satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in your country? 
 
–2 = Not at all satisfied +2 = Very satisfied 0.491 1.28 
2. In your opinion, how stable is democracy 
in your country? 
 




Table 4.  Survey items that measure ability, along with mean and standard deviations for Mali respondents. 












 32.  How would you rate water in your community? –2 = Poor +2 = Very good 0.002 1.42 33.  Do you think that water has improved, stayed the same, 
or gotten worse from a year ago? 
–2 = Gotten worse +2 = Improved 0.528 1.19 
34.  How would you rate roads in your community? –2 = Poor +2 = Very good –0.840 1.42 
35.  Do you think that roads has improved, stayed the same, 
or gotten worse from a year ago? 
–2 = Gotten worse +2 = Improved 0.048 1.44 
36.  How would you rate electricity in your community? –2 = Poor +2 = Very good –0.703 1.52 
37.  Do you think that electricity has improved, stayed the 
same, or gotten worse from a year ago? 
–2 = Gotten worse +2 = Improved –0.046 1.37 
38. In your neighbourhood, how often do you have 
electricity? 



















28.  How would you rate education in your community? –2 = Poor +2 = Very good –0.184 1.38 
29.  Do you think that education has improved, stayed the 
same, or gotten worse from a year ago? 
–2 = Gotten worse +2 = Improved 0.471 1.30 
30.  How would you rate health care in your community? –2 = Poor +2 = Very good –0.102 1.37 
31.  Do you think that health care has improved, stayed the 
same, or gotten worse from a year ago? 













40.  How much do economic problems in the country worry 
you? 
–2 = A lot +2 = Not at all 1.529 0.96 
41.  How much does border security worry you? –2 = A lot +2 = Not at all 1.193 1.22 
42.  How much does terrorist attacks in neighbouring 
countries worry you? 
–2 = A lot +2 = Not at all 0.859 1.44 
43. How much does the war in Iraq worry you? –2 = A lot +2 = Not at all 0.482 1.51 
44.  How much does the Palestinian/Israeli crisis worry you? –2 = A lot +2 = Not at all 0.526 1.52 




Table 5.  Guttman’s λ6 values for Tables 2-4 and related factors for all countries.  Shaded 





















Trust in Government   0.70 0.61 
    Trust in Government Agencies 0.77 0.66   
    Trust in Policy Makers 0.78 0.63   
Trustor Propensity 0.78 0.66 0.71 0.63 
Free & Fair Society 0.78 0.67 0.71 0.63 
Democracy 0.77 0.66 0.72 0.62 
Essential Services 0.77 0.64 0.72  
    Essential Services, current    0.63 
    Essential Services, changes in    0.66 
Electricity 0.78 0.64   
Roads 0.77 0.64   
Education & Health Care   0.72  
Security Concerns 0.78 0.62 0.74 0.64 
Economics & eth. relations/borders 0.79   0.65 
Terrorism Concerns    0.64 
C. ANALYSES 
We evaluated Mayer et al.’s Integrative Model of Organizational Trust (Figure 1) 
for explaining citizens’ trust in government by fitting structural equation models (SEMs via 
the R lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) using standard maximum likelihood estimation, with 
robust standard errors and a Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic.  Before doing so, we 
assessed the joint significance of the ability, integrity, benevolence, and trustor propensity 
measures in Tables 2-4 and Appendix B with the trust in government measure(s) for the 
four countries via “Baseline” multiple regression models (see Kulzy, 2012).  These models 
are similar in approach to those that Kim (2010), Vigoda-Gadot (2006), and Christensen 
and Laegreid (2005) used for modelling trust in government. 
We then evaluated the form of the Mayer et al. model in two ways.  First, we 
assessed whether trust in government is better modelled directly as a function of the 
measures from Tables 3 and 4 (and those in Appendix B for the other countries) expressed 
as first order factors, or whether these first order factors are more appropriately aggregated 
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into second order factors representing ability, integrity, and benevolence.2  The latter would 
be more consistent with the Mayer et al. model of Figure 1.  Second, we also assessed 
whether there might be additional significant predictors of trust in government that are not 
captured by the ability, integrity, and benevolence terms in the Mayer et al. model.  For 
example, our survey also contains items about foreign assistance (Table 6), as well as items 
soliciting respondent opinions of other countries (Table 7), that coalesce into one or more 
factors.  Testing whether these “non-Mayer” measures are significant in the models helped 
us assess whether the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust might require additional 
terms to best model trust in government. 
Thus, using the Mali measures to illustrate, we fit the “Baseline” multiple regression 
model shown in the path diagram of Figure 2.  Per convention, the squares denote observed 
variables (in the form of responses to survey questions), the circles are latent variables 
(originally derived via exploratory factor analysis), and the arrows denote paths (see the 
Results section for significance tests).  In the Baseline model, all of the factors directly 
affect the trust in government variable additively.  To simplify this and subsequent path 
diagram displays, we suppress the measurement error and disturbance terms, as well as 
labeling the paths with their associated parameters. 
                                                 
2 Here we are using the terminology of Rosseel (2012) and Hair et al. (2009), where first order 
factors are those factors that are measured directly via survey items, while second order factors 
are functions of the first order factors.  Rosseel (20012, p. 6) describes the second order factors as 
comprising the structural part of the model while the first order factors comprise the measurement 
part of the model. 
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Table 6.  Survey items that measure foreign assistance, along with mean and standard deviations for Mali respondents. 













How much do you think that foreign countries [READ NEXT ITEM] in [SURVEY COUNTRY]? 
48.  Helps the military –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot 0.813 1.27 
49.  Improves public health –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot 0.529 1.28 
50.  Strengthens the education sector –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot 0.355 1.30 
51.  Prevents terrorist attacks –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot 0.464 1.33 
52.  Helps reduce corruption –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot –0.212 1.32 
53. Helps develop the economy though 
investment 
–2 = Not at all +2 = A lot 0.474 1.30 
54.  Provides humanitarian aid –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot 0.637 1.32 
55.  Builds roads, bridges, and buildings –2 = Not at all +2 = A lot –0.408 1.37 
Table 7.  Items that measure respondent’s opinions of other countries. 













) Overall, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable option of 
the [READ COUNTRY]? 
56.  United Kingdom –2 = Very unfavorable +2 = Very favorable 0.346 1.20 
57.  France –2 = Very unfavorable +2 = Very favorable 0.695 1.21 
58. United States –2 = Very unfavorable +2 = Very favorable 1.122 1.02 
59.  China –2 = Very favorable +2 = Very unfavorable 1.512 0.84 
60.  Iran –2 = Very favorable +2 = Very unfavorable 0.319 1.23 
61.  Saudi Arabia –2 = Very favorable +2 = Very unfavorable 1.152 1.03 
62. Libya –2 = Very favorable +2 = Very unfavorable 1.324 0.91 
63.  Niger –2 = Very unfavorable +2 = Very favorable 0.455 1.23 




Figure 2. “Baseline” model formulation for Mali.  Squares denote observed variables (in 
the form of responses to survey questions), circles are latent variables (derived via 
exploratory factor analysis), and the arrows denote the paths.  For display simplicity, only 
two “non-Mayer” terms (FA:  foreign assistance, and IO:  International Opinions) are 
shown, though there were various additional terms that varied by country. 
We then compare the Baseline model in Figure 2 to two alternatives.  First, we have 
a model in Figure 3 similar to the Baseline model, except that Trustor Propensity also acts 
as a mediating variable for all the other variables in the model.  We refer to this as the 
“First Order SEM” model formulation, a name that follows from the fact that the model 
only contains first order factors.  Second, in Figure 4, we have the “Second Order SEM” 
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model formulation, where this name follows because the model contains both first and 
second order factors.  For this model, note that the second order factors comprising the 
structural part of the model correspond directly to the Mayer et al. model ability and 
integrity/benevolence constructs of Figure 1, as well as a third “non-Mayer” construct. 
 
Figure 3. “First Order SEM” model formulation for Mali, with trustor propensity acting as 




Figure 4. “Second Order SEM” model formulation for Mali, with second order factors for 
ability and integrity/benevolence, per Mayer et al.’s (1995) Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust, as well as other “non-Mayer” terms.  The grey circles are those 





























Our analysis shows that Second Order SEMs are preferred to First Order SEMs and 
the Baseline models.  When comparing model fits by country, this preference manifests 
itself in two ways.  First, as shown in Table 8, the fraction of trust in government variance 
explained (R2) is higher, generally by quite a bit, for the Second Order SEMs compared to 
the other model formulations. 
Table 8.  Fraction of trust in government variance explained (R2 values) for the Baseline, 
First, and Second Order SEMs by country. 
 Burkina Faso Mali Nigeria Senegal 
Baseline Model 0.430 0.340 0.330 0.230 
First Order SEM 0.345 0.390 0.577 0.228 
Second Order SEM 0.512 0.685 0.788 0.270 
Second, Table 9 summarizes the key modelling results where, for the purposes of 
display clarity, we have left out the estimated model parameter values and simply display 
the significance (or lack thereof) of each of the parameters.  (See Tables C-1 to C-4 in 
Appendix C for detailed model results, including p-values.) 
Table 9.  Statistical significance of the paths between the grey factors in the Second Order 
SEM of Figure 4. 
 
Table 9 shows that, broadly speaking, the Mayer et al. model formulation is 
appropriate across all four countries in the sense that virtually all of the terms posited by 
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Mayer et al. are statistically significant.  The only deviations from their theory is that 
trustor propensity is not significant in predicting trust in government in Nigeria and it does 
not significantly predict any of the terms in the Senegal model.  Also, Mali and Nigeria 
have significant “non-Mayer” terms that both are predictive of trust in government and that 
are often predicted by trustor propensity. 
In terms of model fit, the chi-square tests for all four Second Order SEM models are 
significant, though given the survey sample sizes for each country this is expected  
(c.f. Table 12-4 of Hair et al., 2009, as well as the discussion in Chapter 13 of Hoyle, 
2012).  As Table 8 shows, for three of the four countries, the models explain from half to 
three-quarters of the variation in the trust in government outcome measure.  The 
comparative fit index (CFI) is between 0.67 and 0.83 for all four countries (with very 
similar Tucker-Lewis indices) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
is between 0.057 and 0.072 for all four countries.  These are indicative of an adequate 
model fit; but, as we will discuss in the next section, also suggestive that model 
improvements are possible. 
Returning to our hypotheses, we find that our results support two of the three.  
Specifically, for Hypothesis #1, our results show that the Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust is an appropriate framework for understanding and modelling citizen 
trust in government, at least for the four countries in our analysis.  We reach this conclusion 
based on the fact that our SEM results are consistent with the Mayer et al. model for all 
four countries we evaluated. 
For Hypothesis #2, we find that the constructs of the ability, integrity, and 
benevolence factors in the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust are  
country-specific.  What Table 9 does not show, but that is evident from Appendices B and 
C, is that the first order factors that define ability and integrity/benevolence are uniquely 
specified for each country.  For example, ability in Mali consists of effective education 
systems and health care infrastructure and attracting foreign aid and investment, while in 
Burkina Faso ability is much more broadly defined.  This suggests that, while ability, 
integrity and benevolence are indeed predictive of trust in government following the Mayer 
et al. model, just what constitutes ability, integrity, and benevolence is country-specific. 
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For Hypothesis #3, we were unable to find separate benevolence and integrity 
trustworthiness factors, each with a unique impact on trust.  This may be because integrity 
and benevolence do not uniquely contribute to trust, as found in Jarvenpaa et al. (1998), and 
Mayer and Gavin (2005), but it could just as well be due to some weakness in our survey 
items and measures.  Hence, we are unable to reach a definitive conclusion for this 
hypothesis. 
A. DISCUSSION 
Our results are consistent with previous research.  For example, Safadi and Lombe 
(2011), Kim (2010), Vigoda-Gadot (2006), Christensen and Laegreid (2005), and Marlowe 
(2004) all find that governmental ability to provide social services, in one form or another, 
is associated with increased trust in government.  In terms of our integrity/benevolence 
construct, Christensen and Laegreid (2005) find, as we do, that “trust in government 
generally increases according to the level of satisfaction with democracy” (p. 500).  
Marlowe (2004) also finds a positive association between perceptions of a democratic 
system and the trustworthiness of public administrators.  Vigoda-Gadot (2006) finds that 
ethics, as measured in terms of the perceived integrity of civil servants, is a good predictor 
of trust in governance.  Finally, just as we find similarities and differences by country in 
terms of the specific ability and integrity/benevolence components, Kim (2010) finds that 
“there are similarities and differences in the factors affecting public trust in Japan and 
South Korea” (p. 807). 
However, our fundamental supposition is that our results support Mayer et al.’s 
(1995) model.  This is in spite of the fact that the original model was posed as a model of 
trust between individuals and we have applied it to individuals’ trust in an organizational-
level entity:  government.  In particular, we found that models with second order latent 
variables representing ability, benevolence/integrity, and a third “non-Mayer” term 
generally fit better models than other model formulations.  With the exception of Senegal, 
the resulting models explained from just over half to three-quarters of the variation in 
respondent trust in government.  This is substantial for a social science model, though it 
also suggests improvements are possible, particularly with respect to better understanding 
of the “non-Mayer” term or terms. 
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Hence, we posit some modifications to the Mayer et al. model for modelling trust in 
government, both in terms of potential additional factors, and a further delineation of what 
it means for a government to demonstrate ability, benevolence, and integrity.  We illustrate 
these ideas in what we call the Integrative Model of Governmental Trust (Figure 5), where 
to begin we hypothesize that governmental ability has two main facets.  The first facet is 
internal ability, defined as those skills and competencies necessary to provide domestic 
services desired by citizens, such as essential infrastructure, effectively managing the 
country’s economy, providing for individual safety and security, etc.  The second facet is 
external ability, defined as those skills and competencies necessary for governing the 
country within the international community, such as maintaining a national security 
apparatus, attracting external aid as necessary, etc. 
 
Figure 5.  Integrative Model of Governmental Trust. 
 
Similarly, we hypothesize that governmental benevolence/integrity also has two 
main facets.  The first facet is organizational benevolence/integrity, which is defined as the 
extent to which the government adheres to a set of acceptable principles and is operated in a 
manner that is good for the country.  For example, the government operates according to 
democratic principles; it functions in an open and transparent manner; etc.  The second 
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facet is societal benevolence/integrity, which is defined as the extent to which the 
government promotes and advances societal conditions and principles that are good for and 
desired by the citizenry.  For example, the government promotes a society that is free and 
fair, peaceful and tolerant, etc. 
In addition, our results suggest that there may be a third factor or set of factors that 
affect governmental trust.  Unfortunately, there were not enough significant variables in our 
model to fully define it or them, but we hypothesize that they are related to governmental 
reputation.  As with ability and benevolence/integrity, we posit that there may be two facets 
to governmental reputation.  The first facet is the government’s international reputation, 
which is defined as the estimation in which the country and its government is held by the 
international community, including other countries and governments and the people of 
other countries.  For example, it is the perception of whether the government conducts 
effective international relations, the country’s status among the world’s nations, etc.  The 
second facet is the government’s domestic reputation, which is defined as the estimation in 
which the country’s citizenry holds the government.  This is a reputation for effective 
governance, as opposed to, for example, whether or not it is actually effective.  Whether 
this facet can be measured separately from ability and benevolence/integrity is an  
open question. 
The role of reputation in trust in government is potentially an important one because 
it is likely that most citizens have limited personal interaction with their government.  That 
is, unlike in the Mayer et al. interpersonal model in which individuals are likely to have 
multiple opportunities to iterate around the loop shown in Figure 1 and develop trust as a 
result of direct, repeated interaction, most citizens will likely have much less such 
interaction with their government.  Because of this, we expect that individuals will likely 
base at least some of their trust in government on the government’s reputation, as 
determined via mass media, interaction with family, friends, and colleagues, etc.  
Furthermore, there are likely to be aspects of ability, benevolence, and integrity that certain 
citizens are simply unable to observe or experience.  In these cases, the only assessment 
that an individual will be able to make, both of how much to trust the government and how 
much risk is inherent in some action, may be mainly based on reputation. 
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This additional reputation component of trustworthiness is consistent with some of 
the popular business management literature.  For example, Covey and Merrill (2006) say 
that trust is based on four “cores”:  integrity, intent, capabilities, and results.  The first three 
map directly to Mayer et al.’s integrity, benevolence, and ability components of 
trustworthiness.  For the fourth, their “results core,” Covey and Merrill say it “refers to our 
track record, our performance, our getting the right things done.  . . . when we achieve the 
results we promised, we establish a positive reputation of performing . . . and our reputation 
precedes us” (p. 55).  They go on to say that “Results are the fruits—the visible, tangible, 
measurable outcomes that are most easily seen and evaluated by others” (p. 56).  In this 
regard, the reputation component in Figure 3 differs slightly, as reputation is the result of 
both directly observable outcomes and unobserved or unobservable outcomes.  The latter 
aspect is important because unobserved outcomes may be correct, actual outcomes, say as 
related via a responsible news medium, and they may also be incorrect, untrue or distorted 
outcomes, perhaps reported in other types of mass or social media, or that are spread via 
rumour, etc.  Reputation is also a function of the trustor’s viewpoint and disposition. 
Of course, reputation may not be the only non-Mayer trustworthiness construct in 
the Integrative Model of Governmental Trust.  Van Ryzin (2011) finds that institutional 
trust depends on process as much as outcome.  To the extent that Van Ryzin’s process 
construct captures citizen’s observations that the government is ethical and fair, it could be 
a particular dimension of the Mayer et al. benevolence/integrity construct.  If it is based 
more on perception than observation, however, then it may also be a part of the 
hypothesized reputation trustworthiness construct.  Moreover, if it is simply that the process 
in and of itself is important, then it may be that it is an entirely separate construct.   
Vigoda-Gadot (2006) finds that trust in government is a function of satisfaction with 
services, ethics, and organizational politics.  The first two can be mapped onto the Mayer 
ability and integrity/benevolence trustworthiness constructs.  The third, organizational 
politics, is described by Vigoda-Gadot as “unethical or even immoral or corrupt behaviour” 
(p. 287) and as such it is a specific dimension within the Mayer integrity/benevolence 
construct.  However, to the extent that governmental trust depends on the alignment of the 
individual’s political views with the government’s, there may be a different organizational 
politics construct that captures this alignment or misalignment as a separate non-Mayer 
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construct.  This definition of organizational politics is similar to some of the items in 
Christensen and Laegreid’s (2005) political factors construct. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH 
There are two limitations of the current research.  First, as noted earlier in this 
manuscript, the Mayer et al. definition of trust states, in essence, that Person A trusts 
Person B when he or she is willing to be vulnerable to the actions of Person B.  However, 
the items used to measure trust in the current survey do not explicitly examine a person’s 
willingness to be vulnerable to their government.  Instead, the items included are more 
standard “do you trust person X” items.  It is important for future research to include items 
that tap the “willingness to be vulnerable” element of Mayer et al.’s model, as well as the 
more standard trust items included in the current survey. 
That said, the items used in this research are consistent with previous research that 
assessed trust in government using survey items that asked respondents to directly rate their 
trust.  For example, “Please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions [the 
central government, the local government] to operate in the best interests of society”  
(Kim, 2010); “Below are the names of various institutions, such as the police, the cabinet, 
the civil service etc.  How much trust do you have in each of these institutions?” 
(Christensen & Laegreid, 2005); and, “Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best 
for the country” (Van Ryzin, 2011).  Research by Safadi and Lombe (2011), Van de Walle 
(2007), Vigoda-Gadot (2006), Rahn and Rudolph (2005), Marlowe (2004), and Chanley, 
Rudolph, and Rahn (2000) are also based on similar items. 
 Second, the current survey included only one item that explicitly examined the 
Mayer concept of “benevolence.”  Future research should aim to more thoroughly examine 
this construct.  Clearly, any government benevolence construct will probably be 
multifaceted—future work should attempt to examine methods in which governments can 
demonstrate benevolence to their citizenry—and whether citizens perceive those methods 
as benevolent.  Benevolence undoubtedly looks different in different nations with different 
forms of government.  The manner in which a democracy demonstrates benevolence might 
be by passing laws desired by the populace, while a dictatorship might demonstrate 
benevolence by unilaterally increasing spending on similarly desired projects.  Regardless 
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of the mechanism by which benevolence is demonstrated, the question is:  do citizens 





Returning to our model results, our empirical work suggests that the Mayer et al. 
model is an extremely helpful organizational framework for understanding and predicting 
citizens’ trust in government.  Of course, citizens of different countries have specific local 
concerns and needs that impact their trust ratings.  The important point here, however, is 
that the Mayer et al. model is robust to capturing these nuances.  In particular, when 
thinking about trust, we find that just within our four countries some separate trust in their 
individual leaders from trust in broader governmental institutions, while others do not 
distinguish between the two.  Similarly, while this research confirms that Mayer et al.’s 
categories of ability, benevolence, and integrity are relevant and applicable, it also shows 
that each of these is a country-specific construct composed of those things that each 
citizenry judges relevant and important to its society. 
In some sense, this brings us full-circle back to Combs and Blincoe’s (2013) 
assertion that “ability varies from domain to domain and situation to situation,” although 
what we find with trust in government is that the definitions of ability, benevolence, and 
integrity vary from country to country.  This finding thus suggests a series of future 
research opportunities.  One important line of research is further defining survey items from 
which to derive robust measures of the various aspects of ability, benevolence, integrity, 
and reputation.  Another line of research is further evaluating whether or not reputation is 
an important aspect of the model and, if so, whether that is the correct characterization of 
the term.  Then, given these results, political scientists, organizational theorists, and 
international relations experts will likely be interested in comparing and contrasting trust in 





























APPENDIX A:  A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE COUNTRIES IN  
THIS STUDY 
To put the factor analytic and modelling results in perspective, this appendix 
provides a brief summary of the history, geography, and culture of each country in  
the study. 
SENEGAL 
Senegal is a former French colony that gained its independence from France in 
1960.  It is a constitutional republic whose civil law system is derived from French law.  
Senegal’s population is approximately 13 million and its citizenry is more than 90% 
Muslim.  The capital, Dakar, is the westernmost point in Africa, and the country is roughly 
the size of South Dakota. 
Senegal is considered one of the most Westernized countries of Africa and, with the 
country located along historical trading routes, the Senegalese people have thrived 
throughout their history.  Indeed, because of their tenacious nature and focus on business, 
the Senegalese are often referred to as “the New Yorkers of Africa with a French accent” 
(Richmond & Gestrin, 2010).  While its political system has not always been free of 
scandals, Senegal has never had a coup, a fate that has befallen many other African 
countries.  Senegal places great pride in being a stable, democratic country and it has had 
successful, peaceful transitions of power in 2000 and again in 2012, after a very contested 
election. 
NIGERIA 
As a former British colony, Nigeria gained its independence in 1960.  It is a federal 
republic with a mixed legal system derived from English common law, Islamic law in the 
northern states, and traditional law.  Nigeria’s population exceeds 150 million and its 
citizenry is approximately 50% Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% other religions.  Lagos is 
the largest city in Nigeria, with a population of over 11 million, and the country is roughly 
the combined size of California and Nevada. 
Nigeria is a country rich in resources, with strong relationships with the  
United States, China, and Europe, and with an infrastructure that has been developed at 
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levels far superior to other African countries in the region.  However, Nigeria’s rampant 
poverty, internal government strife, bloody coups and assassinations, and flawed elections 
have impeded the country’s development.  Indeed, the wealth of resources has created a 
vicious circle where, with no sense of nationality, corruption in Nigeria has actually 
restricted growth (Rabasa, Boraz, Chalk, Cragin, & Karasik, 2007). 
BURKINA FASO 
Like Senegal, Burkina Faso is a former French colony that gained its independence 
in 1960.  It is a parliamentary republic whose civil law system is derived from French law 
and customary law.  Burkina’s population is about 17 million and is roughly the size of 
Nevada.  It is located about half way between Senegal and Nigeria in the Sahel region of 
Africa.  The religious make-up of its citizenry is approximately 60% Muslim, 25% 
Christian, and 15% other. 
Burkina Faso has had a tumultuous history, with repeated military coups in the 
1970s and 1980s, and it is currently one of the poorest of the countries in the Sahel, and 
hence it is among the poorest in the world.  However, with exports of cotton and gold, and 
as the first African country to receive World Bank/IMF funding and debt relief, it is 
beginning to show signs of economic improvement (World Bank, 2014).  Burkina Faso is 
one of four countries in Africa that recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan.  As one would 
expect, this point of fact remains controversial with China and, as a result, relations have 
been terminated between the two countries and economic advancement has subsequently 
suffered. 
MALI 
Also a former French colony that gained its independence in 1960, Mali’s 
population is estimated to be slightly more than 15 million and the country is roughly twice 
the size of Texas.  Mali has a republican form of government whose civil law system is 
based on French law and customary law.  The southern part of Mali is located between 
Senegal and Burkina Faso in the Sahel region, while the northern part of the country 
extends well into the Sahara desert.  The country is almost 95% Muslim. 
Mali has had a slow start since it became an independent country.  Landlocked, it is 
considered one of the poorest countries in the world, and it was not until the early 1990s 
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that Mali began to enjoy a free society governed by freely elected officials.  After the 
collection of our data, however, Mali had a coup in which their army, displeased with the 
government’s management of a Tuareg rebellion, overthrew the elected president in March 
2012.  Subsequently, the situation in northern Mali deteriorated to the extent that extremist 
forces established a foothold in the region and then expanded their presence throughout the 
northern half of the country.  With French military assistance, the northern part of the 
country was retaken and presidential elections were held in mid-2013.  Security challenges 
remain in the northern part of the country, however, and, as of this writing, controversy 





























APPENDIX B:  EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS  
DETAILED RESULTS 
Table B-1 shows derived measures that capture the notion of trust in government 
generated from (up to) 12 survey items.3  Burkina Faso and Mali have one factor that 
captures trust in all of the government.  For Nigeria and Senegal, the questions coalesce 
into two separate factors:  trust in policy makers and trust in government agencies. 
 
Table B-1.  Trust in government factors for Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  The 
boxes show the factor definitions in terms of their constituent questions and associated 
loadings. 
 
                                                 
3 The numbers in the table are the loadings that correspond to each of the questions on the left and 
the boxes show how the factors are defined in terms of the questions and associated loadings 
(where small loadings are suppressed for reading clarity). 
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Table B-2 shows what we consider to be a reasonable approximation of  
Mayer et al.’s, trustor propensity factor for all four countries.  The similarity in the factor 
definitions across all four countries is striking.  Not only are they constructed of the same 
questions, but the factor loadings are quite similar; this, in spite of the fact that the surveys 
and subsequent factor analyses were conducted completely independently.  These results 
suggest that the trustor propensity construct is robust. 
Table B-2.  Trustor propensity factors for Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  The 
boxes show the factor definitions in terms of their constituent questions and associated 
loadings. 
 
Table B-3 shows a series of factors that appear to capture, at least roughly, the 
integrity/benevolence concepts described by Mayer et al.  For example, we would expect 
any integrity factor to include items regarding government adherence to laws.  The factors 
in Table B-3 clearly support this notion (though they also clearly vary by country).  
Similarly, we would expect any benevolence factor to provide some indication of a 
perception that a government cares about the people.  These factors seem to bear this out.  
One important point to emphasize is, as noted in the main text, that there is some debate in 
the literature regarding the exact nature of the integrity and benevolence constructs, with 
some suggesting that the two might not be so distinct.  The factors in Table B-3 seem to 
support the notion that there is probably some blurring of the constructs. 
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Table B-3.  Integrity/benevolence factors for Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  
The boxes show the factor definitions in terms of their constituent questions and associated 
loadings. 
 
Table B-4 shows the derived ability factors.  As described by Mayer et al., we 
would expect any ability factor to have items related to government competence or ability 










APPENDIX C:  DETAILED MODEL RESULTS 
Table C-1.  Structural equation model results for Burkina Faso. 
lavaan (0.5-15) converged normally after 148 iterations 
  Number of observations                          1418 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Minimum Function Test Statistic             7465.804 
  Degrees of freedom                              1210 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Parameter estimates: 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Standard Errors                             Standard 
 
                   Estimate  Std.err  Z-value  P(>|z|) 
Latent variables: 
  SC =~ 
    Q42               1.000 
    Q43               1.650    0.069   23.882    0.000 
    Q44               1.667    0.069   24.018    0.000 
    Q45               1.711    0.071   24.064    0.000 
  ESF =~ 
    Q29               1.000 
    Q31               1.169    0.063   18.566    0.000 
    Q35               0.949    0.058   16.251    0.000 
    Q33               0.902    0.054   16.774    0.000 
  TC =~ 
    Q46               1.000 
    Q47               0.654    0.135    4.840    0.000 
  E&B =~ 
    Q40               1.000 
  ESN =~ 
    Q38               1.000 
    Q36               1.140    0.084   13.572    0.000 
    Q30               0.381    0.038   10.154    0.000 
    Q34               0.449    0.033   13.450    0.000 
  FFS =~ 
    Q20               1.000 
    Q21               1.317    0.069   19.176    0.000 
    Q22               1.235    0.066   18.804    0.000 
    Q23               1.325    0.071   18.566    0.000 
  TP =~ 
    Q13               1.000 
    Q14               1.884    0.089   21.204    0.000 
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    Q15               2.272    0.101   22.502    0.000 
    Q16               1.861    0.089   20.941    0.000 
    Q17               2.206    0.099   22.252    0.000 
  FA =~ 
    Q48               1.000 
    Q49               1.437    0.074   19.317    0.000 
    Q50               1.387    0.073   18.929    0.000 
    Q51               0.929    0.066   14.176    0.000 
    Q52               0.925    0.060   15.315    0.000 
    Q53               1.294    0.071   18.211    0.000 
    Q54               1.258    0.070   18.082    0.000 
    Q55               1.149    0.069   16.548    0.000 
  TiG =~ 
    Q1                1.000 
    Q2                1.025    0.058   17.706    0.000 
    Q8                1.341    0.065   20.792    0.000 
    Q11               1.526    0.069   21.990    0.000 
    Q10               1.548    0.069   22.324    0.000 
    Q9                1.450    0.067   21.789    0.000 
    Q6                1.569    0.071   22.238    0.000 
    Q5                1.494    0.069   21.750    0.000 
    Q7                1.475    0.069   21.415    0.000 
    Q3                1.510    0.069   21.938    0.000 
    Q12               1.177    0.060   19.579    0.000 
    Q4                1.152    0.058   20.010    0.000 
  Ability =~ 
    SC                1.000 
    ESF               1.706    0.491    3.475    0.001 
    TC                2.220    0.672    3.301    0.001 
    E&B               1.084    0.438    2.475    0.013 
    ESN               1.740    0.531    3.277    0.001 
    FA                1.829    0.505    3.620    0.000 
  Ben&Integ =~ 
    FFS               1.000 
 
Regressions: 
  Ability ~ 
    TP                0.099    0.027    3.696    0.000 
  Ben&Integ ~ 
    TP                0.201    0.043    4.703    0.000 
  TiG ~ 
    TP                0.213    0.057    3.756    0.000 
    Ability           2.273    0.646    3.519    0.000 




Table C-2.  Structural equation model results for Mali. 
lavaan (0.5-15) converged normally after 114 iterations 
  Number of observations                          1874 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Minimum Function Test Statistic            19633.400 
  Degrees of freedom                              2192 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Parameter estimates: 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Standard Errors                             Standard 
 
                   Estimate  Std.err  Z-value  P(>|z|) 
Latent variables: 
  SC =~ 
    Q42               1.000 
    Q43               1.444    0.039   37.332    0.000 
    Q44               1.435    0.039   36.983    0.000 
    Q45               1.453    0.039   37.210    0.000 
    Q40               0.404    0.023   17.328    0.000 
    Q41               0.660    0.030   22.124    0.000 
  E&HC =~ 
    Q28               1.000 
    Q30               1.218    0.059   20.619    0.000 
    Q29               0.836    0.047   17.934    0.000 
    Q31               0.885    0.046   19.275    0.000 
  ES =~ 
    Q32               1.000 
    Q33               0.736    0.040   18.269    0.000 
    Q34               0.927    0.049   18.980    0.000 
    Q35               1.002    0.050   19.981    0.000 
    Q37               1.199    0.051   23.386    0.000 
    Q38               1.581    0.067   23.435    0.000 
    Q36               1.457    0.059   24.631    0.000 
  FFS =~ 
    Q20               1.000 
    Q21               1.038    0.061   16.882    0.000 
    Q22               0.961    0.051   18.895    0.000 
    Q18               0.812    0.041   19.984    0.000 
    Q91               0.791    0.040   19.716    0.000 
  D =~ 
    Q1                1.000 
    Q2                0.778    0.041   19.123    0.000 
  TP =~ 
    Q13               1.000 
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    Q14               2.163    0.103   21.056    0.000 
    Q15               2.467    0.126   19.586    0.000 
    Q16               1.824    0.090   20.288    0.000 
    Q17               2.226    0.127   17.532    0.000 
  FA =~ 
    Q58               1.000 
    Q48               1.908    0.112   16.998    0.000 
    Q49               2.032    0.117   17.328    0.000 
    Q51               2.021    0.119   16.990    0.000 
    Q52               1.821    0.111   16.427    0.000 
    Q53               2.239    0.125   17.858    0.000 
    Q54               2.168    0.124   17.546    0.000 
    Q55               1.486    0.102   14.506    0.000 
  IO =~ 
    Q59               1.000 
    Q57               0.636    0.037   17.045    0.000 
    Q60               1.072    0.041   26.069    0.000 
    Q56               0.885    0.038   23.268    0.000 
    Q61               0.614    0.032   19.245    0.000 
    Q64               0.785    0.037   21.486    0.000 
  TiG =~ 
    Q8                1.000 
    Q11               1.337    0.089   14.990    0.000 
    Q10               1.566    0.088   17.731    0.000 
    Q9                1.472    0.088   16.774    0.000 
    Q5                1.940    0.099   19.504    0.000 
    Q7                1.532    0.091   16.763    0.000 
    Q3                1.583    0.081   19.488    0.000 
    Q4                1.096    0.061   17.959    0.000 
  Ability =~ 
    E&S               1.000 
    E&HC              0.663    0.135    4.896    0.000 
    ES               -0.040    0.101   -0.392    0.695 
    FA                1.459    0.204    7.150    0.000 
  Ben&Integ =~ 
    FFS               1.000 
    D                 2.824    0.312    9.058    0.000 
  Non-Mayer =~ 
    IO                1.000 
Regressions: 
  Ability ~ 
    TP                0.110    0.025    4.369    0.000 
  Ben&Integ ~ 
    TP                0.249    0.038    6.606    0.000 
  Non-Mayer ~ 
    TP                0.365    0.065    5.590    0.000 
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  TiG ~ 
    TP               -0.185    0.081   -2.284    0.022 
    Ability           0.440    0.078    5.611    0.000 
    Ben&Integ         1.688    0.259    6.521    0.000 




Table C-3.  Structural equation model results for Nigeria. 
lavaan (0.5-15) converged normally after 109 iterations 
  Number of observations                          3770 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Minimum Function Test Statistic            29643.090 
  Degrees of freedom                              2257 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Parameter estimates: 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Standard Errors                             Standard 
 
                   Estimate  Std.err  Z-value  P(>|z|) 
Latent variables: 
  SC =~ 
    Q41               1.000 
    Q42               1.544    0.060   25.773    0.000 
    Q43               2.133    0.074   28.764    0.000 
    Q44               2.215    0.076   29.015    0.000 
    Q45               2.163    0.075   28.836    0.000 
  ES =~ 
    Q28               1.000 
    Q30               0.977    0.018   54.061    0.000 
    Q32               0.789    0.019   41.194    0.000 
    Q33               0.709    0.020   34.994    0.000 
    Q29               0.948    0.020   47.918    0.000 
    Q31               0.867    0.019   44.938    0.000 
  R =~ 
    Q34               1.000 
    Q35               0.846    0.023   36.973    0.000 
  E =~ 
    Q36               1.000 
    Q37               0.795    0.028   27.973    0.000 
  E&ER =~ 
    Q40               1.000 
    Q39               1.474    0.221    6.649    0.000 
  FFS =~ 
    Q20               1.000 
    Q21               1.241    0.040   31.328    0.000 
    Q22               1.178    0.036   32.509    0.000 
    Q18               0.607    0.025   24.125    0.000 
    Q19               0.740    0.028   26.667    0.000 
    Q23               1.024    0.036   28.621    0.000 
  D =~ 
    Q1                1.000 
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    Q2                1.093    0.036   30.275    0.000 
    Q24               1.522    0.043   35.469    0.000 
    Q25               1.470    0.042   35.426    0.000 
  TP =~ 
    Q13               1.000 
    Q14               1.579    0.039   40.999    0.000 
    Q15               1.489    0.039   38.617    0.000 
    Q16               1.328    0.036   36.745    0.000 
    Q17               1.257    0.038   32.847    0.000 
  FA =~ 
    Q48               1.000 
    Q49               1.001    0.026   38.441    0.000 
    Q50               1.059    0.027   39.587    0.000 
    Q51               0.996    0.028   36.216    0.000 
    Q52               0.954    0.027   35.285    0.000 
    Q53               0.972    0.026   36.837    0.000 
    Q54               0.979    0.026   37.114    0.000 
    Q55               0.828    0.026   31.941    0.000 
  IO1 =~ 
    Q60               1.000 
    Q63               0.853    0.032   26.977    0.000 
    Q62               1.236    0.036   33.980    0.000 
    Q61               1.232    0.038   32.323    0.000 
    Q64               0.748    0.030   25.265    0.000 
  IO2 =~ 
    Q57               1.000 
    Q56               1.491    0.059   25.431    0.000 
    Q58               0.877    0.032   27.844    0.000 
  TiA =~ 
    Q8                1.000 
    Q11               1.040    0.037   27.849    0.000 
    Q10               1.111    0.037   29.954    0.000 
    Q9                0.970    0.036   27.160    0.000 
    Q6                1.170    0.038   31.125    0.000 
    Q7                1.215    0.038   31.594    0.000 
  TiP =~ 
    Q5                1.000 
    Q3                1.375    0.038   36.664    0.000 
    Q4                0.895    0.025   35.153    0.000 
  Ability =~ 
    SC                1.000 
    ES                5.259    0.419   12.543    0.000 
    R                 5.690    0.452   12.599    0.000 
    E                 4.523    0.366   12.352    0.000 
    E&ER              0.879    0.123    7.157    0.000 
    FA                2.580    0.226   11.410    0.000 
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  Ben&Integ =~ 
    FFS               1.000 
    D                 1.383    0.090   15.421    0.000 
  TiG =~ 
    TiA               1.000 
    TiP               0.667    0.038   17.449    0.000 
  Non-Mayer =~ 
    IO1               1.000 
    IO2               0.925    0.093    9.919    0.000 
 
Regressions: 
  Ability ~ 
    TP                0.064    0.007    9.101    0.000 
  Ben&Integ ~ 
    TP                0.188    0.016   11.389    0.000 
  Non-Mayer ~ 
    TP                0.196    0.021    9.245    0.000 
  TiG ~ 
    Ability           0.914    0.106    8.586    0.000 
    Ben&Integ         1.223    0.080   14.330    0.000 




Table C-4.  Structural equation model results for Senegal. 
lavaan (0.5-15) converged normally after 265 iterations 
  Number of observations                          1661 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Minimum Function Test Statistic             9716.000 
  Degrees of freedom                              1061 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000 
 
Parameter estimates: 
  Information                                 Expected 
  Standard Errors                             Standard 
 
                   Estimate  Std.err  Z-value  P(>|z|) 
Latent variables: 
  SC =~ 
    Q42               1.000 
    Q43               1.599    0.062   25.924    0.000 
    Q44               1.537    0.059   25.939    0.000 
    Q45               1.674    0.063   26.380    0.000 
  ES =~ 
    Q28               1.000 
    Q30               1.259    0.058   21.787    0.000 
    Q32               0.772    0.051   15.236    0.000 
    Q33               0.842    0.052   16.350    0.000 
    Q29               1.056    0.055   19.222    0.000 
    Q31               1.295    0.061   21.402    0.000 
  R =~ 
    Q34               1.000 
    Q35               1.268    0.090   14.062    0.000 
  E =~ 
    Q38               1.000 
    Q37               0.859    0.044   19.464    0.000 
  FFS =~ 
    Q21               1.000 
    Q22               1.988    0.152   13.047    0.000 
    Q23               1.376    0.090   15.285    0.000 
  TP =~ 
    Q13               1.000 
    Q14               3.029    0.206   14.694    0.000 
    Q15               4.953    0.324   15.289    0.000 
    Q16               2.129    0.156   13.629    0.000 
    Q17               4.244    0.300   14.162    0.000 
  D =~ 
    Q1                1.000 
    Q2                0.931    0.056   16.595    0.000 
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  TiG =~ 
    Q8                1.000 
    Q11               1.628    0.151   10.751    0.000 
    Q10               1.631    0.151   10.827    0.000 
    Q9                1.017    0.117    8.698    0.000 
    Q5                3.587    0.266   13.468    0.000 
    Q3                3.902    0.288   13.545    0.000 
    Q4                2.825    0.215   13.170    0.000 
    Q6                2.899    0.224   12.948    0.000 
  Ability =~ 
    SC                1.000 
    ES                4.539    1.141    3.977    0.015 
    R                 5.365    1.348    3.980    0.018 
    E                 3.643    0.943    3.862    0.014 
  Ben&Integ =~ 
    FFS               1.000 
    D                22.782   11.939    1.908    0.056 
 
Regressions: 
  Ben&Integ ~ 
    TP                0.046    0.025    1.857    0.063 
  Trust ~ 
    Ability           0.998    0.271    3.685    0.000 
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